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163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998)
L Facts
Harris Thomas Stone ("Stone"), an elderly resident of Danville, was
found dead in his bed on Sunday, November 3, 1985.1 Stone had a history
of heart disease, and thus when the local medical examiner found no sign of
bruising and only a slight abrasion on the chest, he concluded that Stone's
death was the result of heart failure.2 The regional medical examiner's office
in Roanoke amended the finding of the cause of death to alcohol poisoning
when Stone's blood alcohol content was later analyzed and reported to be
0.41%.' The funeral director, Jack Miller, called a bruise or abrasion over
the left ribs to the attention of the police, but the police told Miller that the
local medical examiner believed the bruise was an old one.' Though Miller
disagreed with the local medical examiner, he embalmed the body on
instructions from the police.'
1. Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 863 (4th Cir. 1998), stay granted, No. 98-8384,
1999 WL 179763 (U.S. April 2, 1999), cert. granted, No. 98-8384, 1999 WIL 148296 (U.S. April
5, 1999). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following issues: (1)
whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. S2254(d)(1), a state
habeas court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot be "contrary to" Federal
law as determined by the United States Supreme Court unless it is in "square conflict" with
a United States Supreme Court decision that is "controlling as to law and fact"; (2) whether
the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that, under 28 U.S.C. S2254(d)(1), a state habeas
court's decision to deny a federal constitutional claim cannot involve "an unreasonable
application of" clearly established Federal law as determined by the United States Supreme
Court unless the state court's decision is predicated on an interpretation or application of
relevant precedent that "reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable"; (3) whether the
Fourth Circuit erred in reformulating the Strickland test so that ineffective assistance of
counsel claims may be assessed under the Lockhart "windfall" analysis even where the trial
counsel's error was no "windfall"; and (4)whether the Fourth Circuit erred in reformulating
the Strickland test so that the petitioner must show that absent counsel's deficient perfor-
mance in the penalty phase, all twelve jurors would have voted for life imprisonment, even
where state law would have mandated a life sentence if only one juror had voted for life
imprisonment. Petition for Certiorari, Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, No. 98-8384, 1999 WL 148296 (U.S. April 5, 1999). For a discussion of both
Strickland issues, see infra Part III.A.





Almost six months after Stone's death, the chief of police in Danville
received an anonymous letter from an inmate of the local jail in which the
author wrote: "I can't write or spell too good. Please bare with me.
[A]bout that man Who Die on Henry St .... Well, I kill him myself."6
After the letter was received, two detectives interviewed Terry Williams
("Williams"), an inmate of the Danville jail at the time, and he implicated
himself in the crime.' Williams later gave additional confessions to the
murder and robbery of Stone. Williams said he had first struck Stone in the
chest, and lateron his back, with a mattock and had removed three dollars
from Stone's wallet. Stone's body was subsequently exhumed. On July 2,
1986, Dr. David Oxley, a forensic pathologist and Deputy Chief Medical
Examiner for Western Virginia, performed an autopsy. When Dr. Oxley
opened the body, he found Stone's fourth and fifth ribs on the left side had
been fractured and displaced inward, puncturing the left lung and depositing
a quantity of blood in the left chest cavity.'
Williams was indicted on July 7, 1986, for the capital murder of Harris
Thomas Stone on November 2, 1985, while in the commission of the armed
robbery of Stone. A second count of the indictment charged Williams with
the robbery of Stone during the course of the capital murder.' On Septem-
ber 30, 1986, a jury found Williams guilty of both charges and sentenced
him to seven years imprisonment for the robbery. In a separate proceeding
mandated by Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4, after hearing evidence of
Williams's history, including aggravating factors and mitigating evidence,
the jury fixed Williams's sentence at death, based on his "future dangerous-
ness." After considering the probation officer's report and other evidence
in a further hearing, the trial court, by its order dated November 19, 1986,
sentenced Williams to death for capital murder.'"
After his conviction for capital murder and death sentence were af-
firmed,"1 and his state petition for habeas corpus denied,12 Williams peti-
tioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
for habeas corpus relief." The district court ordered that the writ be granted
on the ground that Williams's trial counsel were ineffective in failing to
present certain evidence in mitigation of punishment during the sentencing
phase of the trial. On appeal, the Commonwealth contended that the writ
6. Williams v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 361, 363 (Va. 1987).
7. Id. at 364.
8. Id at 364.
9. Id at 363 (citing VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(D) (Michie 1998)).
10. Id
11. Williams, 163 F.3d at 862 (citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 361 (Va.
1987)).
12. Id. at 864 (citing Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194 (Va. 1997)).
13. Williams, 163 F.3d at 862 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. S 2254 (West Supp. 1998)).
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was erroneously granted. 4 Williams cross-appealed, claiming that his lead
trial counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase."
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
in part and reversed in part, holding that: (1) the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's decision that Williams was not prejudiced by his counsel's allegedly
deficient performance was not an unreasonable application of United States
Supreme Court precedent; 6 (2) the Supreme Court of Virginia did not make
an error in fact in characterizing alleged mitigating evidence; 7 (3) the diag-
nosed depression of Williams's lead trial counsel did not render counsel's
representation ineffective; 8 and (4) counsel was not otherwise ineffective. 9
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In granting the writ of habeas corpus, the district court concluded that
in reviewing Williams's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington"
and Lockhart v. Fretwell' in finding no prejudice.22 According to the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland, The "benchmark" for evaluating an
14. Id. at 862.
15. Id at 864.
16. Id at 871-74.
17. Id. at 860. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court made an error in fact in its finding of no preju-
dice when the Virginia Supreme Court characterized the alleged mitigating evidence as
"mostly relatives [who] thought the defendant was nonviolent and could cope well in a
structured environment." Williams, 163 F. 3d at 870 (quoting Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d
194, 200 (Va. 1997)). In fact, one of the mitigation witnesses was Williams's friend Bruce
Elliot. On the importance of family and friends witnesses in a capital case, see Scott E.
Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay
Testimony, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1997). Professor Sundby's research reveals that juries
frequently identify witnesses who are family and friends as among those who are the most
favorable to the defense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's description of both the witnesses and the nature
of their testimony was reasonable. The court of appeals held that the district court erred in
granting the writ because the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was not based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing held by the Danville Circuit Court. Id (citing 28 U.S.C.A. S 2254(d)(2) (West Supp.
1998)).
18. Williams, 163 F.3d at 871-74.
19. Id
20. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
21. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
22. Williams, 163 F.3d at 864.
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim is "whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."23 Strickland set out the
following now-familiar two-pronged test for determining ineffective assis-
tance of counsel: (1) whether defendant received reasonably effective assis-
tance; and if not, (2) whether a reasonable probability existed that the
outcome would be different had counsel's error not occurred.24 In Lockhart
the United States Supreme Court held that in some limited and unusual
cases, a proper prejudice analysis must consider "whether the result of the
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.""
According to the district court, the Supreme Court of Virginia's appli-
cation of the Strickland prejudice standard was unreasonable because there
was a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have concluded
that the death penalty was not warranted had the evidence in question been
presented.26 In addition, the district court also determined that the prejudice
standard in Lockhart only applied in "'the unusual circumstance where the
defendant attempts to demonstrate prejudice based on considerations that,
as a matter of law, ought not to inform the inquiry."'2 On appeal, the
23. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
24. Id. at 686.
25. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993).
26. Williams, 163 F.3d at 868 (noting that the Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(E)
provides that a death sentence must be unanimous). According to the report of the Danville
Circuit Court, Williams's trial counsel failed to investigate and present in mitigation
Williams's juvenile records, evidence of Williams's early home life, testimony of Williams's
estranged wife and daughter, and the testimony of a friend. The Danville Circuit Court
concluded that the mitigation evidence "probably would have been given weight by at least
one juror," and because a death sentence must be unanimous, Williams was prejudiced by trial
counsel's failure to present the mitigating evidence. l at 867 (noting that the Virgina Code
section 19.2-264.4(E) provides that a death sentence must be a unanimous one).
27. Id. at 868 (quoting Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 373 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The facts
of Lockhart are as follows: at trial, defendant Fretwell was sentenced to death by an Arkansas
jury based on an aggravating factor that duplicated an element of the underlying fel-
ony-murder in the course of a robbery. Had Fretwell's counsel known of and cited Collins
v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985), at sentencing, Fretwell would not have been
sentenced to death because Collins held that the use of an aggravating circumstance that
duplicated an element of the crime itself violated the Eighth Amendment. The Arkansas
Supreme Court declined to address Fretwell's claim on its merits on direct appeal because the
issue was not raised at trial. Four years later, at habeas, the claim was couched as an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim based on the failure of Fretwell's counsel to raise Collins. By
this time, Collins had been overruled. The United States Supreme Court held that counsel's
failure to make the Collins objection during the sentencing proceeding did not constitute
prejudice within the meaning of Strickland. To show prejudice under Strickland, a defendant
must demonstrate that counsel's errors are so serious as to deprive him of a trial whose result
is fair or reliable. According to the Court in Lockhart, unfairness or unreliability does not
result unless counsel's ineffectiveness deprives the defendant of a substantive or procedural
right to which the law entitles him. The sentencing proceeding's result in Fretwell was
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Strick-
land prejudice standard "assumes twelve reasonable, conscientious, and
impartial jurors, [and] that one hypothetical juror might be swayed by a
particular piece of evidence is insufficient to establish prejudice." 8 More-
over, the court stated that the prejudice standard in Lockhart, that a defen-
dant must show that the proceeding itself was fundamentally unfair or
unreliable, is not limited to the "unusual" case. According to the court, "the
standard for prejudice set forth in Lockhart is not an exception to the Strick-
land standard, but rather a clarification."29 The court concluded that the
Supreme Court of Virginia's finding of prejudice was not based on an
unreasonable application of the tests set forth in Strickland and Lockhart,
and thus the district court erred in granting the writ.
Despite the fact that a death sentence must be unanimous under Vir-
ginia Code section 19.2-264.4 (E), the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
district court was mistaken in suggesting that the Strickland prejudice
standard could be met with a showing that there was a reasonable probabil-
ity that at least one juror would have concluded that the death penalty was
not warranted had the evidence in question been presented.3" The court
held that "the Strickland prejudice standard assumes twelve reasonable,
conscientious, and impartial jurors. Thus, that one hypothetical juror might
be swayed by a particular piece of evidence is insufficient to establish
prejudice."31 This holding is not only conclusory, but it is not responsive
to the reality of Virginia law.
In addition to ignoring the reality of one juror in determining preju-
dice, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the more stringent Lockhart test as a
"clarification" of the already difficult two-pronged Strickland test; conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit added another amorphous layer to the test and
rendered the success of any ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the
court very unlikely, if not entirely impossible, in the future.32 The failure
of the Fourth Circuit to find prejudice even where it recognized that "trial
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,"33
suggests that the court requires only a minimal level of assistance on the part
of counsel. It should thus be recognized that the standards of the Fourth
neither unfair nor unreliable because the Eighth Circuit, which had decided Collin in 1985,
overruled it in Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1989), four years later. Thus,
Fretwell suffered no prejudice from his counsel's deficient performance. Lockhart, 506 U.S.
at 364-65.
28. 11.
29. Id. at 868.
30. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(E) (Michie 1998).
31. Williams, 163 F.3d at 867.
32. The Fourth Circuit last gave relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel twelve
years ago in Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987).
33. Williams, 163 F.3d at 866-67.
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Circuit are insufficient to provide meaningful guidance, and that defense
counsel must rely on his or her own professional standards and personal
integrity in providing the defendant with effective assistance.
B. Expert Witness Issues
After Williams's defense counsel suggested to the court that Williams
might lack the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or assist
counsel in his defense, the court appointed Dr. Centor to examine Williams.
Although he was not appointed by the court, Dr. Ryans assisted Dr. Centor
in this competency evaluation. During the sentencing phase of the trial,
both Dr. Centor and Dr. Ryans were called by the Commonwealth as
witnesses, and both doctors testified that based solely on Williams's criminal
history, Williams represented a future danger to society. 4 These events
were the basis of Williams's claim that his defense counsel was ineffective for
the following reasons: (1) failing to object to the dual appointment of mental
health experts; (2) failing to use the court-appointed experts in violation of
Ake v. Oklahoma;" (3) failing to bar the Commonwealth's use of the court-
appointed experts; and (4) failing to rebut the court-appointed experts'
damaging testimony. 6 The court found the first two claims to be procedur-
ally defaulted. The court rejected the third claim on the ground that the
experts' testimony was not based on any statements made to them by the
defendant in the competency evaluation but rested instead exclusively on a
review of the defendant's criminal record. 7 Williams's fourth claim was
rejected by the court because "a criminal defendant does not have a right to
favorable expert testimony.""
The appointment of Dr. Centor, the assistance of Dr. Ryan at Wil-
liams's competency evaluation, and the later testimony of the two for the
Commonwealth at the sentencing phase should illustrate serious issues for
defense counsel in capital cases. To begin with, defense counsel should seek
to ensure that any competency evaluation is strictly limited to the questions
of whether a defendant understands the proceedings against him and
whether he can assist his attorney in his own defense. The report generated
by the competency expert is distributed to both the defense and the prosecu-
34. Id. at 872.
35. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
36. Williams, 163 F.3d at 872.
37. Id. at 873 (citing VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3 (Michie 1998)). The court also notes
that even if trial counsel's performance was deficient in failing to object to the Dr. Centor's
and Dr. Ryan's participation in both the competency hearing and the sentencing phase,
"Williams's prior criminal activity alone was more than enough to support a finding of future
dangerousness. As a result, the testimony of Dr. Ryans and Dr. Centor to the same effect was
not prejudicial." I at 873 n.8. The essence of this difficult-to-understand conclusion then
is that expert testimony has no impact on juries.
38. Id. (citing Waye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 766-67 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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tion, and thus nothing should be revealed about the defendant beyond what
is absolutely necessary for a determination of competency. In addition,
defense counsel should never permit without objection the appointment of
either Dr. Centor or Dr. Ryan by the court, for any purpose, because they
have a demonstrated history of bias in favor of the Commonwealth in the
sentencing phase of capital trials." Thus, if these doctors examine a defen-
dant for competency and then later testify, based solely on the defendant's
criminal record, that the defendant represents a "future danger to society,"
the jury will still know that they examined the defendant to determine his
competency to stand trial. The fact that the doctors met previously with
the defendant in person will certainly lend credibility to their testimony at
the sentencing phase. Finally, should a court appoint either Dr. Centor or
Dr. Ryan as a mental mitigation expert under Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.3:1 ("3:1"), defense counsel should object on the ground that the lan-
guage of 3:1 makes it clear that the expert appointed is a partisan expert
meant to assist in the preparation of mitigation evidence. Given the records
of both Dr. Centor and Dr. Ryan as prosecution witnesses, neither is
competent to be designated as a defense mitigation expert.40
Paige B. McThenia
39. Centor and Ryan are not the only biased experts. Contact the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse for further information.
40. Defense counsel can request that the court appoint an expert to assist the defense
in its preparation of evidence relevant to sentencing. Under 3:1, this expert creates a report
for defense counsel which specifically addresses certain questions relevant to the defendant's
mental status. However, if defense counsel decides to have this a ppointed expert testify at
trial, 3:1 provides that the Commonwealth is entitled to receive the report prepared by the
expert for the defense counsel and that the Commonwealth may have an examination of the
defendant performed by its own court-appointed expert. For this reason, while it is essential
that defense counsel use any court-appointed experts to understand, prepare, and present
mental evidence, it is seldom wise to actually call the court-appointed expert to testify at trial.
Defense counsel should seriously consider using court-appointed experts as full members of
the defense team but should stop short of calling them as experts to testify at trial. For an
insightful discussion of the tactical decisions surrounding the use of expert testimony in
mental mitigation, see Douglas S. Collica, Alice in Wonderland Interpretations: Rethinking the
Use ofMentalMitigation Experts, CAP. DEF.J., Fall 1996, at 57. Seealso C. Cooper Youell, IV,
Case Note, CAP. DEF. J., Fall 1996, at 21 (analyzing Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593 (4th Cir.
1996)); Matthew Keil Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 137 (1998) (analyzing Stewart v.
Angelone, No. 97-26, 1998 WL 391646 (4th Cir. May 29, 1998)).
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